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ON TRIAL: JUDGE JULIUS HOFFMAN
The trial judge needs considerable experience in arriving at a
just sentencing decision. To improve judicial proficiency in sen-
tencing, a number of programs have been developed. The Joint
Committee for the Effective Administration of Justice assisted in
the organization of nearly fifty regional seminars available to almost
every trial judge sitting in a state court of general jurisdiction.' In-
stitutes devoted entirely to sentencing, which are presently con-
ducted in the federal system, are also used for improving sentencing
skills.2 Since 1959, the judges of all the federal circuit courts have
had an opportunity to participate in at least one institute.3 That it
would be highly desirable for all jurisdictions to conduct sentencing
institutes to provide a forum for judges to discuss the disparity of
sentencing within their courts has been recognized by numerous
legal authorities.4 Furthermore, that a great deal of unjustified dis-
parity does exist has been amply demonstrated by a multiplicity of
studies.5 Other illustrations of disparity are described in the findings
of the workshop sessions at the Federal Institute on Disparity of
Sentences.'
Obviously the need for giving judges discretion in sentencing
is to' permit variation based on relevant differences in offenders.
Therefore, a lack of uniformity in sentences is, within certain limits,
justifiable. However, sentencing which is unwarranted in its dis-
parity is a denial of the principle of evenhanded administration of
criminal law.7 Former United States Attorney General Robert H.
Jackson put it another way:
It is obviously repugnant to one's sense of justice that the judgment
meted out to an offender should be dependent in large part on a
purely fortuitous circumstance; namely, the personality of the partic-
ular judge before whom the case happens to come for disposition.8
I INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, JUDICIAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 89-111 (1965).
2 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1964).
3 37 F.R.D. 115-16 (1965).
4 L. YOUNGDAHL, REMARKS OPENING THE SENTENCING INSTITUTE PROGRAM, 35
F.R.D. 387, 390-91 (1964); R. VAN DUSEN, TRENDS IN SENTENCING SINCE 1957
AND AREAS OF SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT IN SENTENCING PRINCIPLES, id., at 395 (1964).
5 S. RUBIN, CRIMINAL CORRECTION, 116-19 (1963); P. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE
AND CORRECTION, 441-46 (1960).
6 SEMINAR AND INSTITUTE ON DISPARITY OP SENTENCES, 30 F.R.D. 401, 429-31
(1961).
7 S. RUBIN, DISPARITY AND EQUALITY OF SENTENCEs-A CONSTITUTIONAL CHAL-
LENGE, 40 F.R.D. 55 (1966).
8 A.B.A. PROTECTION ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-APPEL-
LATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, 23, 24 (Approved Draft 1968).
385
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
It was in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois: that a multiplicity of sentences, unwarranted in
their disparity, were delivered against defendants in a conspiracy
case for contempt. Judge Julius Hoffman between 2:35 and 4:05
P.M. on Wednesday, November 5, 1969, declared a mistrial in a
conspiracy trial that included defendant Bobby G. Seale and sen-
tenced this defendant for a term of three months on each of sixteen
certified contempts, the sentences to run consecutively. Thus, de-
fendant Seale is to serve four years for sixteen criminal contempts
committed during the five-week period between September 24 and
November 5, 1969. At the completion of the conspiracy trial five
of the remaining defendants and their defense attorneys received
contempt sentences to be served consecutively that range from six
months to four years. I0
The scope of this review is to examine the procedural and sub-
stantive regularity of the contempt sentences imposed. It is not a
question of whether the various defendants are guilty of contuma-
cious conduct in the courtroom, nor whether they should or should
not be punished, nor whether the federal courts have the power to
punish them. Rather, the questions are, who should sit in judg-
ment? And what limitations are there to assure rectitude of court-
room proceedings without detracting from judicial discretion by
improvident uses of summary contempt procedures? This includes
the scope of appellate review as a means of enforcing or revising
a trial court judge's use of judicial discretion in summary con-
tempt procedures.
AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURE FOR SUMMARY CONTEMPT
A federal district court judge has the power to punish the mis-
behavior of any person in his presence or so near thereto as to in-
terfere with the administration of justice." Such contemptuous con-
duct may be punished summarily where the presiding judge cer-
tifies that he saw or heard the conduct and that the acts constituting
the contempt were committed in the actual presence of the court. 2
From the very nature of their institution the courts of the United
States possess the power to punish for contempts in order that their
B United States v. Dellinger, 69 'CR 180 U.S. Dist. Ct. for the No. Dist. of Ill.-
East. Div. (1970). A mistrial in this case was declared as to defendant Seale on
November 5, 1969.
10 d. At the conclusion of the trial, but 'before a verdict had been returned by
the jury, the remaining contempt sentences were summarily meted out.
11 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964).
12 FEn. R. CRIM. P. 42. There is no limitation on the sentence that can be imposed
by statute by a federal district court judge.
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lawful judgments may be respected and enforced.'3 The statutory
intent is to safeguard constitutional procedures by limiting courts
in contempt cases to the least possible power adequate to the pro-
tection of justice against immediate interruption of its business. 4
Put another way, the power of the district courts should be exer-
cised only to insure decorum in the court, loyalty of its officers, and
to enforce obedience to their lawful orders, decrees and judgments. 5
Sentences for criminal contempt are punitive in their nature so as
to vindicate the authority of the court. 6 There are a great many
types of offenses, ranging from disrespect for the court to acts other-
wise criminal, for which a person may be found in contempt. 7 Con-
tempt proceedings are not controlled by the limitations of the
Constitution upon ordinary criminal prosecutions" so that they are
not subject to the right to trial by jury.'9 Thus, a defendant charged
with criminal contempt for having used abusive language directed
against the court during trial is not entitled to a jury trial.2" The
defendants in the immediate case were convicted of multiple counts
of criminal contempt in the presence of the court room and, hence-
forth, comments will be restricted to that type of contempt.2
The fact that criminal contempt in the presence of court is
summarily dealt with does not require an immediate sentencing.22
That the trial judge does not act at once, upon the occurrence of
each incident, and waits until the completion of the trial, does not
preclude the trial judge from summarily punishing the alleged con-
temptuous conduct.2' Except for defendant Seale, this was the pro-
cedure followed by Judge Hoffman. It should be noted that Judge
Hoffman, like any other federal district judge, is allowed by statute
to reduce an imposed sentence within sixty days of the termination
of the contempt proceedings.24
I3 Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
14 In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945).
15 Berry v. Midtown Service Corp., 104 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1939).
16 Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) ; United States v. United Mine
Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Field v. United States, 193 F.2d 86 (2d
Cir. 1951).
17 18 U.S.C. §§ 401-02 (1964).
18 Camarota v. United States, 111 F.2d 243, 246 (3d 'Cir. 1940).
19 Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31 (1890).
20 United States v. Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1003 (1965), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1965).
21 FED. R. Calm. P. 42.
22 In re Osborne, 344 F.2d 611, 616 (9th Cir. 1965).
23 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 11 (1952), rehearing denied, 343 U.S.
931 (1952).
24 Flores v. United States, 238 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Miller v. United States,
224 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1955). FED. R. Camm. P. 35.
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CASE LAW LIMITATIONS ON SUMMARY CONTEMPT SENTENCES
What is complained of in the immediate case is the quantitative
time involved in the sentences, that is, those sentences that exceed
six months in total duration. In the not too distant past a four-year
sentence for a single criminal contempt for failing to respond to a
surrender order was upheld as being a reasonable exercise of judi-
cial discretion.25 Two years later the Supreme Court affirmed that
there was no statutory authority prohibiting the imposition of a
sentence of more than one year for criminal contempt. 26 The Court,
in Brown v. United States,27 in a five-to-four decision, upheld a
fifteen-month sentence for criminal contempt even though the sen-
tence was in excess of the maximum punishment authorized for the
crime of which defendant was being questioned.28 The dissent in
the Brown case is significant because it was to be the basis for
limiting future summary contempt sentences and because the divided
court showed its increasing sensitivity to lengthy sentences without
a trial by jury.20 This was shown by the Court's subsequent reduc-
tion to six months of a one-year criminal contempt sentence, stating
that the power to exercise punishment should be exercised with
restraint. °
During 1964, the Court again wrestled with the problem of
limiting the time duration of criminal contempt sentences and in-
dicated that the punishment which may be imposed after a non-jury
contempt conviction is limited to that which is allowed for petty
offenses. 1 Relying on this decision, the United States District Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied the District of
Columbia Code criteria for non-jury trials as being any offense pun-
ishable by ninety days or less. 2 Since each federal district court
judge might apply a local state criteria for non-jury trials, then the
maximum punishment for criminal contempt would vary from state
to state depending on how each state defined petty offenses. The
following year the Court again confronted the issue of limiting sum-
mary contempt sentences and stated that it was the least possible
25 United States v. Thompson, 117 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. N.Y. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 214 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1954).
26 United States v. Green, 140 F. Supp. 117, 121 (S.D. N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 356
U.S. 165 (1958).
27 359 U.S. 41 (1959).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 53-63 (Warren, C.J.).
30 United States v. Levine, 288 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1961). The Court strained to
find that there were mitigating circumstances to warrant the reduction.
31 United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 695 n.12 (1964).
32 Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 277-78 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; D.C. CODE
§ 11-715(a) (1961).
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power to adequately obtain the purpose sought." The Court's lan-
guage was at best a retreat from the petty offense limitation since
it is broad enough to allow a judge to impose any sentence of his
choice. For example, in the case under review, Judge Hoffman's
contempt sentences are within the broad language above so long as
he certifies that they are the least possible to adequately obtain the
purpose sought-restoring the dignity of the court. However, the
petty offense limitation laid down by the Supreme Court a year
earlier would place a definite limitation upon the sentences imposed.
Furthermore, the above language is similar to that already in ex-
istence for over a decade.34
The need for a clear and precise rule for placing a limitation
on summary contempt proceedings in federal courts was apparent. In
Cheff v. Schnackenberg" the Supreme Court laid down such a rule
for federal courts to follow in sentencing criminal contempts. The
Court reasoned that since petty offenses have always been summarily
punished without a jury 6 and since any sentence of six months or
less qualified as petty, then any sentence exceeding six months could
not be imposed by a federal court without a jury trial or waiver
thereof by the defendant. 7 The Court specifically noted that it was
laying down a new rule under its supervisory power and that the
new ruling was not to interfere with the power of a reviewing court
to revise sentences in criminal contempt cases.3" The language of the
Court suggests that it is not only reserving the right in itself to
further review and revise sentences; but also, it is encouraging ap-
pellate courts to revise sentencing on review, at least in criminal
contempt cases. Some appellate courts, relying on the petty offense
limitation in Cheff, have merely reduced contempt sentences to six
months where they have been in excess thereof,39 while at least one
other reviewing court has made a substantial revision in the sen-
tences imposed.4"
33 Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965). This case specifically overrules
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959).
34 Widger v. United States, 244 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Yates v. United States,
227 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1955). When a federal court proceeds under FED. R. CRIM. P.
42(a), it must be careful to observe procedural safeguards, and that power must be
narrowly construed when exercised.
-5 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) for definition of petty offenses.
37 384 U.S. at 380.
38 Id. at 375-76.
39 United States v. Temple, 372 F.2d 795 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
961 (1967); United States v. Harris, 367 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1010 (1967).
40 United States v. Conole, 365 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1025 (1967). In this case, corporation directors who wilfully disobeyed a court re-
straining order were given fines ranging from $1,000 to $5,000, but the court of
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Placing aside for the moment the problem of consecutive sen-
tences, the very least that may be deduced from the above discus-
sion is that sentences in United States v. Dellinger exceeding six
months will be reduced to a maximum of six months. The very most
to be expected is a substantial reduction in the imposed sentences
for all the contemners upon appellate review.
The importance of the Cheff decision was demonstrated in 1968
when the Court applied it retroactively; and where a defendant had
served more than six months for criminal contempt without a jury
trial or waiver thereof, the time was to be applied toward any other
sentence that defendant might be serving." A two-year summary
contempt sentence by an Illinois state court prompted the Court
to extend the right to a jury trial for contempt to the state courts
where the sentence exceeded six months.2 The opinion declared
that prosecutions for contempts of more than six months are sub-
ject to the jury trial provisions of Article III, Section 2, of the
Federal Constitution and the sixth amendment, which is binding
upon the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.48 Here the Court reaffirmed prior decisions that there is no
need for a jury trial in contempt proceedings, but if the sentence is
too severe, then the upholding of such a sentence would be an un-
acceptable construction of the Constitution.4
CONSECUTIVE CONTEMPT SENTENCES
Perhaps the sentence imposed upon the defendants in the case
under review is within the rulings of the Supreme Court. No single
contempt sentence imposed by presiding Judge Hoffman exceeds the
six-month maximum which would have required a jury trial. Rather
it is the combined total of the contempt sentences which exceeds the
six-month period. To draw such a conclusion would be to overlook
the basic premise which permeates the recent holdings of the Su-
preme Court. In Cheff, the Court was primarily concerned with a
defendant being summarily sentenced to imprisonment for criminal
contempt for a period of more than six months without having been
given the opportunity of a jury trial.45 There is an implicit require-
ment in recent opinions regarding contempt that the judge's discre-
appeals reduced the fines by 90 per cent. The court stated that there is an implicit
requirement that discretionary authority be exercised with restraint.
41 Mirra v. United States, 402 F.2d 888, 889 (2d Cir. 1968).
42 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
43 Id. at 198.
44 Id.
45 See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
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tionary authority be exercised with restraint. 6 Furthermore, there
is no precedent for attaching sentences consecutively to achieve the
gross disparity reached in the instant case. 7 Finally, in Frank v.
United States48 the Court noted that it is the severity of the sen-
tence actually imposed that the reviewing courts look to in deciding
on whether there has been an abuse of discretionary judgment by the
district judge.
There are four separate considerations that should be kept in
mind to determine the validity of attaching consecutive summary
contempt sentences to achieve a total sentence of more than six
months without a jury trial. These considerations, dealt with in the
above paragraph, are: One, the Court's concern in Cheff over sum-
marily sentencing a defendant to more than six months imprison-
ment without a jury trial; two, the implicit requirement that judi-
cial discretion in contempt proceedings be exercised with restraint;
three, the lack of any precedent for attaching consecutive contempt
sentences to achieve summary imprisonment of more than six
months; four, the very recent holding in Frank that the Court will
look to the sentence actually imposed to determine if there has been
an abuse of discretionary judgment. Each consideration taken by
itself presents a weighty argument that Judge Hoffman may have
gone beyond the limitations of his discretionary authority; but when
all four considerations are viewed together the conclusion is in-
escapable that Judge Hoffman has indeed abused his discretionary
authority by imposing sentences of up to four years in duration.
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE IN CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
There are certain situations in which a trial court judge,
whether state or federal, is not qualified to preside over a summary
proceeding for criminal contempt. The general rule followed by
46 United States v. Conole, 365 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1025 (1967).
47 In United States v. Sacker, 9 F.R.D. 394 (S.D. N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d 416,
418-31 (2d Cir. 1950), criminal contempts ranged from five to twenty-three counts
against defendants and their counsels during a trial for conspiracy to overthrow the
government. The sentences were from thirty days to six months to be served "con-
currently." In Offutt v. United States, 208 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1953), rev'd, 348 U.S.
11 (1954), the district court judge cited the defendant for twelve counts of contempt
in the presence of the court of which four were upheld, and the sentence was reduced
from ten days to forty-eight hours. In the case of In re Du Boyce, 241 F.2d 855
(3d Cir. 1957), defendant was arrogant and her complete misconception of judicial
procedure culminated in disorderly conduct and defiance of trial judge, resulting in a
$50 fine with suspended jail sentence of 15 days. The appellate court praised the trial
judge for his patience and objectivity.
48 89 S. Ct. 1503, 1505-06 (1969).
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state and federal courts, as stated in Patterson v. Colorado,4 9 is that
a direct contempt against the court is not sufficient grounds in itself
to disqualify a judge from presiding over the contempt proceed-
ing.5 An elaboration on the rule properly points out that if it were
not followed, the power of a judge to summarily punish contemp-
tuous conduct in his presence would be nullified." However, when
the contempt charged involves criticism of or disrespect to a judge,
that judge may be disqualified from sitting in judgment of and sen-
tencing the contemners.52 The Supreme Court's suggested procedure
for such a judge to follow is to request the Chief Judge of the dis-
trict court to assign another judge to hear the charge and make an
impartial determination thereof. 3 This would insure the defendant
a fair and just hearing and sentence if needed. Should the tran-
scripts of the instant case show that some or all of the contempt
charges resulted from criticism of or disrespect to Judge Hoffman,
then it may be determined on appeal that he was acting in revenge
rather than in the best interest of justice. In the case of defendant
Bobby Seale, the transcripts reveal that almost every contempt
charge involved a critical exchange between the defendant and the
judge.54 As to this defendant, the judge ought to have disqualified
himself.
One must keep in mind that the purpose of the power to sum-
marily punish for contemptuous conduct in the courtroom is to
vindicate the dignity of the court and to restore decorum.5 Hence,
if a judge uses his discretionary summary contempt power in a
proper manner to enforce obedience and order in his courtroom,
then this would seemingly be a correct usage of his authority. How-
ever, where the judge waits until the termination of the trial, as in
the case herein under review, then it is doubtful that he is qualified
to sit in judgment since the purpose of restoring order in the court-
room is no longer present.5 It is a fair conclusion to note that be-
cause of the failure of immediate sentencing in the instant case, any
doubt as to the propriety of Judge Hoffman's sitting in judgment
should be resolved against him and in favor of the defendants.
49 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
50 Id. at 463; see Parmelee Transportation Co. v. Keeshin, 294 F.2d 310 (7th Cir.
1961).
51 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952), rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 931
(1952).
52 United States v. Bradt, 294 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1961).
53 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 12 (1954), rev'g 208 F. Supp. 842 (D.C.
Cir. 1953).
54 See note 9 supra.
55 See note 15 supra, and accompanying text.
56 See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 593, 620 (1959).
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APPELLATE REVIEW OF DISCRETION AND SENTENCING AT
TRIAL COURT
It should be obvious that the case under review will be ap-
pealed to the higher courts; so it is advantageous to note some of
the traditional hurdles in the judicial process that must be over-
come or confronted. The federal appellate courts once had statutory
authority to review sentences, but this authority was implicitly with-
drawn when the statute was revised. 7 That a person may appeal
from a contempt sentence is clear;" but that the sentence will be
reviewed is doubtful.5" Appellate courts, because of their lack of ex-
plicit authority to review a trial court judge's discretion in sen-
tencing, have oftentimes come to anomalous decisions on procedural
or substantive law so as to reverse harsh sentences.6 0 The fact that
some judges have a reputation for their character and that it affects
their sentencing is supported by the testimony of the former Direc-
tor of Federal Prisons:
That some judges are arbitrary and even sadistic in their sentencing
practices is notoriously a matter of record. By reason of senility or a
virtually pathological emotional complex some judges summarily im-
pose the maximum . . .on certain .. .or all types of crimes . . . . I
know of one judge who continued to sit on the bench and sentence
defendants to prison while he was undergoing shock treatments for
mental illness.6'
57 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTIcE-APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, 14 (Approved Draft 1968).
58 Kaplan v. United States, 234 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1956).
59 See United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764, 767-68 (4th Cir. 1964); Smith v.
United States, 273 F.2d 462, 468-69 (10th Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion) ; United
States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604-07 (2d Cir. 1952). These cases held they lacked
the power to review the merits of a sentence. Wilson v. United States, 26 F.2d 215
(8th Cir. 1928), which stated that review is confined to errors of law; Shibley v.
United States, 236 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1956),
rehearing denied, 352 U.S. 919 (1956); MacInnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157
(9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1951) ; Moore v. United States, 150 F.2d
323 (10th Cir. 1945); Huffman v. United States, 148 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1945);
Keeney v. United States, 17 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1927), holding that contempt sen-
tences will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion; Robles v. United
States, 279 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1960), which held that the severity of punishment for
contempt is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
s0 APPELLATE REvIEw OF SENTENCES: A SYMPOSIUM AT THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRcUIT, 32 F.R.D.
249, 289-90 (1962) [hereinafter cited as SymPosium]. Former Chief Judge of the
Fourth 'Circuit Simon E. Sobeloff put it this way: "Many appeals are docketed today
only because of the severity of the sentence pronounced in the district court and since
the appellate tribunal cannot tackle the real issue in a forthright manner, it may, and
often does, in its endeavor to strike down a harsh penalty, give the law a strained
construction liable to work havoc in future cases." Id. at 271.
61 A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: APPELLATE
REvi~w oF SENTENCES, 23, 24 (Approved Draft 1968).
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To say of these jurisdictions that in no other area of our law does
one man exercise such unrestricted power and in no other country
in the free world is this condition permitted is not an overstatement. 62
CONCLUSION
A substantive reading of the above paragraph should shock the
conscience of any free man. Former United States Attorney General
Robert Kennedy ranked sentence disparity as one of our foremost
problems almost ten years ago. 63 Yet, in the case under review, we
are confronted with one district court judge who is attempting to
broaden judicial discretion in the area of summary contempt sen-
tences. This is one facet of trial court discretion in sentencing that,
at the very least, ought to be held in check by making a six-month
sentence without a jury trial, or waiver thereof, the absolute max-
imum. It is not equality of sentencing that is needed, rather it is the
need for equality in the philosophies of judges handing down sen-
tences. 64 There is a real need for legislation which would enable ap-
pellate courts, both state and federal, to review sentencing. Never-
theless, even without enabling legislation the Supreme Court holding
in Cheff seems to give the requisite authority to courts to review
contempt sentences.66
RECOMMENDATIONS: GENERAL AND SPECIFIC
There are these general recommendations: First, federal dis-
trict judges throughout the United States ought to make an in-
creased use of the judicial institutes for just sentencing practice
until sentence disparity has been significantly alleviated.67 At the
same time, the second recommendation would be for appellate
courts, both state and federal, to assume a more responsible posture
by reviewing sentences. This could be done under one interpretation
of Che f.68 Third, at the earliest opportune moment, the Supreme
Court ought to formulate a procedure for appellate courts to review
62 SymPosium at 265 (remarks of Judge Sobeloff).
63 R. KENNEDY, SEMINAR & INSTITUTE ON DISPARITY OF. SENTENCES, 30 F.R.D.
422,425 (1961).
.64 Id. at 426.
15 Levine, Toward a More Enlightened Sentencing Procedure, 45 NEB. L' REv.
499 (1966); Youngdahl, Development and Accomplishments of Sentencing Institutes
in the Federal Judicial System, 45 NEB. L. REv. 513 (1966); S. RuBNn, DISPARITY
AND EQUALITY OF SENTENCEs-A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE, 40 F.R.D. 55 (1966).
See also 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1964).
66 See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
67 See notes 1, 2, & 3 and accompanying text supra.
68 See notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text supra.
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sentences, pursuant to its power to supervise inferior court deci-
sions.69
The concluding procedural recommendations are specific in
nature and are applied to the instant case.
The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is severely limited
over district courts in criminal cases, precluding an examination of
the contempt sentences by direct appeal.7" However, the Court's
certiorari jurisdiction is plenary in scope71 and may be exercised
"before or after rendition of judgment" by a court of appeals.72 The
only requirement is that the case be docketed in the appellate
court.73 Thus, a writ of certiorari would be the speediest method to
get a determination and resolve the issues raised.
There remains yet another way for the Supreme Court to obtain
jurisdiction over the case before an appellate court has made a deter-
mination. At any time where a court of appeal desires instructions
on a question of law in a criminal case it may do so by means of
certification.74 Hence, an appellate court that is troubled over the
lawfulness of imprisoning a contemner for more than six months
without a jury trial, or waiver thereof, may certify the question to
the Supreme Court for instructions. The Court may then require the
entire record to be sent up for a decision on the entire case or it
may give binding instructions for the appellate court to follow.7" In
actuality this gives an appellate court a way out from coming to
grips with the matter of a trial court judge's discretion in sentencing
for contempt.
It does seem, however, that the final decision will rest with the
Supreme Court. The justices should find that no person can be sum-
marily imprisoned without a jury trial, or waiver thereof, for more
69 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-57 (1964); 18 U.S.C. § 3731
(1964).
70 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1964) limits appellate review by the Supreme Court of dis-
trict courts to cases where a federal statute has been held unconstitutional, while 18
U.S:C. § 3731 (1964) allows review only on certain types of judgments adverse to the
United States.
71 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1964).
72 Id.
73 Id. § 2101(e). A writ of certiorari "will be granted only upon a showing that
the cause is of such imperative public importance as to justify the deviation from
normal appellate process and to require immediate settlement in the court." SUPREME
CT. R. 20. Furthermore, the Court may vacate or summarily reverse the judgment
below at the time it grants certiorari if a majority of the justices believe oral argu-
ment to be unnecessary because the lower court's decision is clearly erroneous. R.
STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 220 (4th ed. 1969).
74 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1964).
75 Id.
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than six months. If it is decided that Judge Hoffman's personal feel-
ings entered into the contempt sentences, then the sentences should
all be substantially modified or remanded for a hearing by an im-
partial judge. It is not difficult for one to believe that the hoped-for
gains from a prosecution of this kind would be lost unless it were
demonstrated that the American legal process could accomplish
justice.
Timothy B. McGrath
